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Abstract 
This article explores the relationship between metaphorical languages, body, and 
culture, and suggests that such an analysis can reveal a great deal about the meaning 
and experience of pain in Anglo-American societies between the eighteenth and 
twentieth centuries. It uses concepts within embodied cognition to speculate on 
how historians can write a history of sensation. Bodies are actively engaged in the 
linguistic processes and social interactions that constitute painful sensations. 
Language is engaged in a dialogue with physiological bodied and social 





Pain, metaphor, body, culture, history, British, American, cognitive linguistics 
 
Contact Information 
Professor Joanna Bourke 
Department of History, Classics, and Archaeology 
Birkbeck, University of London 




Note on Contributor 
Joanna Bourke is Professor of History at Birkbeck College, University of London. She 
has published extensively on the history of modern warfare, the emotions, sexual 
violence, and what it means to be human. Her book on the history of pain will be 











 Pain undermines mind-body dichotomies: the cry ‘it hurts, here!’ is both an 
assertion about the localisation of pain in the body as well as a testimony to 
amorphous suffering. This article explores those languages that people seize hold of 
in order to overcome some of the obstacles they face when attempting to express 
pain. Figurative languages are central to all attempts at communicating unpleasant 
sensations to oneself as well as to others. Pain-talk is swollen with metaphor, simile, 
metonym, and analogy. Why are such linguistic devices so crucial to painful 
experiences? Can the exploration of the figurative or metaphorical languages of pain 
enable us to speculate on historical changes in the sensation of pain? I will be 
arguing that an analysis of the dynamic interconnections between language, culture, 
and the body can contribute to a history of sensation.  
 
 The three concepts of language, culture, and the body are shorthand terms 
for complex phenomena. None are discrete entities: each exists in relationship to the 
others, and an adjustment in one inevitably modifies the other two.  First, my 
approach to ‘language’ is influenced by the non-representational theories of 
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phenomenological philosophers, in which language is intricately intertwined with 
‘lived experience’. This approach has its critics, some of whom argue that an 
historical study of pain (to take the example that interests me here) is nothing more 
than a study of representations of pain. In other words, language is ‘”about” nothing 
other than itself’ or, in another version, it ‘wholly constitutes experiences’. Social 
theorist Thomas Csordas has a nice retort to this critique, pointing out that the 
‘polarization of language and experience is itself a function of a predominantly 
representational theory of language’. Instead, he argues, it is perfectly plausible to 
argue that language  
 
gives access to a world of experience in so far as experiences comes 
to, or is brought to, language…. The notion that language is itself a 
modality of being-in-the-world… is perhaps best captured in 
Heidegger’s notion that language not only represents and refers, but 
‘discloses’ our being-in-the-world (Csordas 1994, 11). 
 
Metaphor plays a central role in these acts of disclosure, particularly in the context 
of pain-talk. For this reason, most of my discussion of language refers to the full 
range of figurative languages. 
 
Secondly, the term ‘culture’ is shorthand for social and environmental 
interactions. It includes both interpersonal relations as well as people’s engagement 
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with all aspects of their surroundings. Finally, when I refer to ‘the body’ I am not 
referring to a natural, pre-social entity. Although there are material components to 
the body, the concept ‘body’ is not interchangeable with physiology. The body is 
always more than a sum of its corporal parts. At times, I will refer to the 
‘physiological body’, but this is simply a rhetorical stratagem for drawing attention to 
the fact that bodies are also fleshy, fluid entities, but nevertheless accessed and 
experienced through language.  
 
In this article, therefore, I seek to show how these three strands are 
inextricably entangled in the context of figurative languages generally, and pain-
languages specifically in Anglo-American cultures from the eighteenth century 
onwards. As we shall see, bodies are not simply receptacles of sensations, but are 
actively engaged in the linguistic processes and social interactions that constitute 
those sensations. Language is engaged in a dialogue with physiological bodies and 
social environments and culture does not simply ‘inscribe’ its texts upon a natural, 
pre-social body, but collaborates in the creation of physiological bodies and 
metaphoric systems. In this way, this ‘language, culture, body’ model is an 
interactive one, each strand intertwined in an active, dynamic relationship.  
 
B. The Importance of Metaphorical Languages 
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 It may be useful to say a few very general words about metaphor, before I go 
on to a more detailed analysis of the relationship between metaphorical languages, 
body, and culture. I will be using the term metaphor in its broadest sense, that is, as 
a rhetorical figure of speech that employs association, comparison, or resemblance. 
In this way, metaphor refers not only to an analogy between two things (‘pain 
gnawed at his stomach’), but also as simile (‘the pain felt like a rat, gnawing his 
stomach’) and metonym (‘the gnawing continued’). 
 
Etymologically, metaphor comes from the Greek words meta and pherin, or 
‘to transfer’ and ‘to carry beyond’. Through metaphor, a concept is transferred into a 
context within which it is not usually found, extending its meaning. Metaphors 
enable people to move a subject (in this case, pain) from inchoateness to 
concreteness. As such, metaphor is not simply an ornament of communication but, 
as cognitive scientist Raymond Gibbs observed, it is a ‘specific mental mapping that 
influences a good deal of how people think, reason, and imagine in everyday life’ 
(1999, 145). Human language is thoroughly infused with metaphoric figures of 
speech. Indeed, they cannot be avoided. Thus, Susan Sontag’s celebrated assertion 
in Illness as Metaphor that metaphors are inherently stigmatizing and must be 
avoided in illness narratives is not only wrong, but also impossible. Ironically, her 
book is brimming with opulent and elegant metaphors (1990). 
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Metaphors are particularly useful when people are attempting to convey 
experiences most resistant to expression. Indeed, because pain narratives are most 
often fragmentary, rather than elaborate accounts, the analysis of metaphors can be 
particularly rewarding for historians of pain. It is difficult to imagine how people 
could communicate (to themselves as well as to others) the sensation and meaning 
of pain without metaphoric crutches. Crucially, by using metaphors to bring interior 
sensations into a knowable, external world, sufferers attempt to impose (and 
communicate) some kind of order onto their experiences.  
 
C. The Body and the Creation of Metaphor 
 
Figurative languages have an even greater significance than this implies. It is 
useful to turn to that remarkable book entitled Metaphors We Live By (1980), in 
which linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark L. Johnson argue that metaphors 
are based on embodied experiences. Crucially, these intrinsically-embodied 
metaphors are integral to cognitive processes. Metaphor ‘is not just a matter of 
language, that is, of mere words’, they observed. Rather, ‘human thought processes 
are largely metaphorical’ (1980, 6). Linguists and philosophers have subsequently 
developed this relationship between metaphor and the body, and, I will be arguing, 
their insights can be used to underpin a history of sensation. 
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A crucial starting point is the inherent embodiment of consciousness. As 
philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty argued, we don’t own our bodies; we are them 
(Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2002, np (Part I). Furthermore, the subjective character of 
experience (its phenomenological content) does not simply arise from interactions in 
the world but is constituted by those interactions. In The Body in the Mind (1990), 
Mark Johnson observed that reality is ‘shaped by the patterns of our bodily 
movement, the contours of our spatial and temporal orientation, and the forms of 
our interaction with objects’ (1990, xix). This view is expressed even more concisely 
in Lakoff and Johnson’s Philosophy in the Flesh (1999). ‘Our mind’, they insist, ‘is 
embodied in the profound sense that the very structure of our thoughts come from 
the nature of our body’ (6). Gibbs was also drawing upon the dialectic between body 
and language when he contended that people’s ‘embodied experiences give rise to 
their metaphorical structuring of abstract concepts, which in turn, constrains 
speakers’ use and understanding of language’ (1999, 148). Basic bodily actions, such 
as ‘pushing, pulling, grasping, standing, walking, and interacting with a physical 
environment’ provide the more ‘elementary forms of knowledge’, psychiatrist 
Laurence Kirmayer explained, while ‘more abstract concepts are built on a 
scaffolding of simpler metaphors which in turn can be traced back to sensorimotor 
image schemas’. In this way, metaphors ‘bridge the bodily given and the culturally 
configured social world’ (2007, 369 and 371). 
 
In order to understand how they came to such conclusions, a detailed 
exposition of certain concepts is necessary. It will be followed by a discussion about 
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the ways that historians can use such concepts in non-reductionist way in order to 
illuminate changes over time in pain-languages. Language, body, and culture turn 
out to be inextricably entwined. 
 
According to cognitive linguists, people form image schemata out of 
sensorimotor bodily experiences, which are then projected metaphorically onto the 
wider world. These image schemata (generally written in small-caps, as in BALANCE or 
CONTAINMENT) are dynamic gestalt patterns that are based on recurring features in 
the physical interaction between the environment and the body. Take, for example, 
the image schema BALANCE. Balancing, as Johnson explains, depends on bodily 
experiences. It ‘is an activity we learn with our bodies and not by grasping a set of 
rules or concepts’ (1987, 74). It is related to ‘equilibrium in the body, whereby we try 
to maintain an even state – for example, with respect to heat or cold’ (Strathern 
1996, 183). BALANCE therefore forms an image schemata that can then be projected 
on (or elaborated in) other experiences: as in ‘pain weighed down her spirits’. 
Similarly, the CONTAINMENT schema starts from the relationship between the body’s 
boundaries and its interiority/exteriority, and is used metaphorically in statements 
such as ‘she felt pressure on her spleen’. The sensorimotor bodily experience of lying 
down to sleep and standing up when awake is the corporeal basis for the metaphor 
HAPPY IS UP and SAD IS DOWN (in the sense that ‘his spirits rose’ or ‘she fell into a 
depression’). Similarly, the metaphor that HEALTH/LIFE ARE UP and ILLNESS/DEATH ARE 
DOWN (as in ‘He suddenly felt buoyant’ or ‘He was sinking fast’) are based on physical 
comportment relating to vigour versus infirmity (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 15). In 
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each of these instances, the ‘source domain of the metaphor comes from the body’s 
sensorimotor system’ (Gibbs 2006, 99). 
 
The argument that ‘metaphor is in the body’ can be illustrated further by 
looking at two conceptual metaphors: INTENSITY IS HEAT and ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER. Linguist Zoltán Kövecses asks readers to imagine that they are engaged in 
hard labour: 
 
After a while you are beginning to work up heat, you feel hot, and 
maybe you begin to sweat. We can say that the vigorous bodily 
activity produces an increase in bodily heat…. Similarly, when you are 
very angry, or when you have strong sexual feelings, or when you are 
under strong psychological pressure, your body may also produce an 
increase in bodily heat that manifests itself physiologically in a variety 
of ways. In all of these cases, the increase in the intensity of an 
activity or state accompanies an increase in body heat, or your body 
responds this way automatically.  
 
This bodily correlation forms the basis of the conceptual metaphor INTENSITY IS HEAT: 
the correlation between intensity and heat occurs ‘at the level of the body; and in 
this sense metaphor is as much in the body as it is in language or thought’ (2005, 18). 
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Similarly, the schema CONTAINER is behind the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS 
HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER (examples would include ‘he blew his stack’, ‘she hit the 
roof’, and ‘it made her blood boil’). People, Gibbs explains, 
 
have strong kinaesthetic experiences of bodily containment ranging 
from situations in which bodies are in and out of containers (e.g. 
bathtubs, beds, rooms, houses) to experiences of bodies as containers 
in which substances enter and exit. An important part of bodily 
containment is the experience of our bodies being filled with liquids 
including stomach fluids, blood, and sweat. Under stress, people 
experience the feeling of their bodily fluids becoming heated. These 
various, recurring bodily experiences give rise to the development of 
an experiential gestalt, called an image schema for CONTAINMENT 
(1999, 148). 
 
These image schemas are used metaphorically to help people understand and 
communicate more abstract concepts. For instance, the CONTAINMENT schema is 
‘metaphorically elaborated to explain some of the complex ways that we structure 
single abstract concepts’, such as anger. Again, in the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS 
HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER, people 
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know that when the intensity of anger increases, the fluid in the 
container rises (i.e. ‘his pent-up anger welled up inside him’), people 
know that intense heat produces steam and creates pressure on the 
container (getting hot under the collar – blowing off steam – bursting 
with anger), and people know that when the pressure of the 
container becomes too high, the container explodes (‘She blew up at 
me’) (Gibbs 1999, 148). 
 
In these examples, body-based schemata are transferred though metaphor from one 
(bodily) context to another.  
 
D. Pain-Metaphors and the Body  
 
Given the ways that painful sensations affect autonomic arousal, cardio-
vascular responses, and sensorimotor actions it is not surprising that body-based 
schemata are central to languages of pain. For instance, the most common 
conceptual metaphor in pain-speech is PHYSICAL STATES ARE INDEPENDENT ENTITIES. For 
example, pain was a ‘monster’ (Anon. ‘Professional review’ 1898, 38). In her First 
World War diary, a VAD recalled a patient who would wake up sobbing with pain: 
‘Don’ [sic] go away nurse’, he would beg, and then he would point into the rafters, 
cry ‘There’s the pain!’ (Bagnold 1918, 102). As an independent entity, pain could be 
all-enveloping. Mrs. M. was a terminally ill patient in St. Joseph’s Hospice in 1961. 
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She conceived of her pain as an independent entity that so entirely enclosed her 
body that even the approach of other people aroused it. In her words, 
 
It – I would say the pain was so bad that I dreaded anyone touching 
me and when anyone knocked my bed or came near me – the first 
thing I said to them – ‘please don’t touch me. Please don’t move 
me’…. It was an obsession in a way because it was all round me. 
 
Powerful analgesics were experienced as cushioning her from this oppressive 
independent entity. Pain relief made her feel  
 
very comfortable indeed. It it [sic] seemed to be that… there was 
something between me and the pain. It was like a nice thing wrapping 
around me. It was (‘Mrs. E’ 1963, np). 
 
Conceiving of pain as a separate entity could, in fact, help exert power over that 
unpleasant entity. As Frederick Nietzsche famously quipped, ‘I have given a name to 
my pain’: it is called “dog”’. In this way, Nietzsche’s pain was ‘just as faithful, just as 
obtrusive and shameless, just as entertaining, just as clever as any other dog, and I 
can scold it and vent my bad mood on it, as others do with their dogs, servants, and 
wives’ (1974, 249-50). 
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An extended version of this conceptual metaphor was PHYSICAL STATES ARE 
INDEPENDENT ENTITIES WITHIN A PERSON. In the words of a wagon driver, pain ‘throbs and 
darts as if something was running though it’ (Wesbrook 1778-81, np). In 1901, Alice 
A. complained of a pain in her head: she felt as though ‘something about an inch 
long were moving about in her throat, and as though the top of her head were being 
pricked and being moved up and down’ (Bulstrode 1901, 4). Humorously, The 
[Adelaide] Advertiser used this metaphor in a sketch entitled ‘The Pain’ (1927), in 
which an ‘Anxious Mother’ asks: ‘You don’t look well, Johnny. Are you in pain? 
Johnny responded with ‘No, mummy. The pain’s in me’ (‘The Pain’ 1927, 8). 
 
 The conceptual metaphor INTENSITY IS HEAT is another common one. Pain was 
heat: it was fire or sun; it seared, boiled, burnt. It was a ‘spark of fire, shooting up 
the wounded finger’ (Anon. ‘The mad dog’ 1836, 27), ‘like a hot iron being placed on 
his right ear’ (Anon. ‘Dispatches from Kimberley’ 1899, 7); and a ‘terrible sensation 
of molten lead running down my arm’ (Leriche 1939, 65). In the 1860s, labourer 
Joseph Townend described his wound (caused by undergoing an excruciating 
operation without anesthetics) as ‘smoking’. Later, when the only partially-healed 
lesion was violently torn open again, he observed that ‘my poor side was drenched 
in blood, and smoked, almost like a kiln’ (1869, 12-3 and 18). This was also the 
metaphor that came most readily to the pen of Anthony Babington. When reflecting 
on the suffering caused by his war wounds and tuberculosis, Babington claimed that 
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it was like ‘walking for a long time in the sweltering heat of a fierce sun’; death 
would be ‘sweet and merciful – like the shade of a great tree’ (1954, 184).  
 
 The third important conceptual metaphor – the BODY IS A CONTAINER – is not 
surprising, given that wounds and illness often do represent a fracturing of bodily 
integrity. Often, an agent was identified. It was a knife: cancer pains were ‘like that 
of a stab of a knife’ (Ure 1852, 735) or, as another woman complained a few years 
later, ‘It seems, at each breath, as if a knife were passing through me…. It seems as if 
a heavy weight were crushing in my breast’ (Arthur 1858, 183). Pain was ‘like knives’, 
patients grumbled in the 1870s: it was a ‘knife-like spasm’, or ‘as though someone 
was giving… repeated violent digs with a knife’ (Buzzard 1878, 168 and 172-73). In 
1895, a 44-year-old fireman at the Royal Infirmary described his pain in his shoulder 
as ‘dead burning heat… like red-hot sand or iron passing through the flesh…. A knife 
driving straight in…. shooting… cutting’ (Monro 1895, 567). A patient in 1950, 
claimed that pain was ‘like a knife stuck to the bone’ (Hubbell 1950, 204). 
 
Other times, hammers were identified as the weapon breaching the integrity 
of the body. In 1894, a working-class woman described how ‘Sometimes I feel like a 
hammer knocking in my belly. This week my breasts bite me so, that I cannot 
describe it’ (‘Letter from Mrs. S’ 1894, 52). For Mrs. C., speaking from St. Joseph’s 
Hospice in Hackney in 1962, pain was both a hammer and a crushing vice. It was 
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just as bad as it could be. I couldn’t breath… in, and I couldn’t 
breath…. out, could bring nothing up, could force nothing down… it 
was just as if I was in a vice, being crushed…. The chief trouble… was 
the pain behind the shoulder blade… it used to throb as if someone 
were bumping into it with a big hammer (‘Mrs. C.’ 1962, np). 
 
Other weapons were identified. In the early 1900s, sinus pain felt like a ‘red-hot 
circular saw’ (Gray 1938, 90). Or, a constraining rope was responsible for attacking 
the body’s integrity. In 1811, a ‘violent fixed pain at the pit of the Stomach’ was 
described as if it were ‘bound round with a cord’ (Rees 1811, 151).  
 
In each of these examples, the body is not simply the container for feeling 
and acting, but a way of thinking as well. In such ways, autonomic arousal, cardio-
vascular responses, and sensorimotor actions influence the way people think: the 
body provides possibilities (including constraints) for the metaphors adopted. An 
analysis of such conceptual metaphors illustrates some of the ways in which people 
think via sensorimotor experiences: our minds are embodied. In Gibbs’ evocative 
phrase, ‘cognition is what happens when the body meets the world’ (1999, 153). 
 
E. Culture Creates Metaphor 
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These ways of thinking about metaphor and the body are useful, but they 
come up against an important problem. Doesn’t the model threaten to ‘flatten out’ 
pain descriptions and universalize the body? Isn’t the physiological body the same 
everywhere? If so, shouldn’t metaphors be remarkably similar all over the world? 
Linguist Ning Yu believes the answer to these two questions is ‘yes’. Despite ‘racial or 
ethnical peculiarities’, she notes, people ‘all have the same basic body structure, and 
all share some common bodily experiences and functions, which fundamentally 
define us as being human’. As a consequence, she reasons, it ‘also follows that our 
body… is a potentially universal source domain for metaphorical mappings’ (2008, 
389). In other words, if metaphors are drawn from physiological sensations, then 
they must be transhistorical and transnational. 
 
In Metaphor in Culture (2005), Kövecses grapples with this issue. He notes 
that the standard view of cognitive linguists is that metaphors are non-
problematically grounded in embodied experiences. Thus, 
 
We metaphorically view affection as warmth… because of the 
correlation in our childhood experiences between the loving embrace 
of our parents and the comforting bodily warmth that accompanies it. 
This gives us the ‘conceptual metaphor’ AFFECTION IS WARMTH…. 
Thinking (by means of AFFECTION IS WARMTH) and talking (e.g. We have a 
warm relationship) of affection in terms of warmth arises naturally 
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from our embodied experience. Probably no one would be surprised 
to hear that affection is universally conceptualised as warmth, rather 
than coldness. To learn such ‘primary’ metaphors is not a choice for 
us: It happens unconsciously and automatically. Because this is a 
universal bodily experience, the metaphor corresponding to it may 
well be universal (2-3). 
 
Superficially, it sounds plausible. But Kövecses goes on to identify an obvious 
problem: even a cursory look at the world’s languages reveals a formidable number 
of non-universal metaphors. He doesn’t use pain as an example, but metaphorical 
diversity is a key feature in pain-speech. For instance, Latinos in North America 
distinguish between a headache (‘dolor de cabeza’) and a brain-ache (‘dolor del 
cerebro’) (Abad and Boyce 1979, 34). The McGill Pain Questionnaire (an extensive 
list of pain-descriptors that was developed in America in the 1960s) could not always 
be translated straightforwardly into other European languages. As two Finnish 
experts reported, 
 
It is not possible to translate this kind of specialized vocabulary into 
other languages without losing its validity, since no dictionary 
contains reliable and meaningful category/intensity equivalents 
(Pöntinen and Ketovuori 1983, 85). 
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Indeed, they discovered, the ‘punishment’ category of the questionnaire, with its 
English-language connection to the idea of retribution for some real or imagined sin, 
was simply incomprehensible to Finnish speakers. ‘Is it that the Finnish cultural 
milieu is unable to associate pain with punishment or merely that the words given 
just did not connect with the emotions characterized by it?’, they wondered 
(Ketovuori and Pöntinen 1981, 252). 
 
When turning to pain-terms in Asia and India, the differences multiple. While 
in English it is common to say ‘I have a pain’, implying that the sufferer possesses an 
object or entity, this is not the case in Thai, where the language of pain is much more 
active and dynamic. As Horacio Fabrega and Stephen Tyma explained, 
 
the absence of nominal primary pain terms in Thai means that it is 
more difficult to qualify pain directly through metaphor as is done in 
English…. In English, the process of metaphorisation allows the 
speaker to qualify his experience in a vivid and direct manner: I have a 
burning pain, I have a firing pain, etc….. and his overt behavior often 
reflects this qualification. The native Thai is not provided with this 
flexible device of metaphorisation in describing his pain…. Pain 
descriptions in Thai are somewhat ambiguous and it would appear 
that for semantic focus speakers are dependent on context (1976, 
329-30 and 332). 
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The Sakhalin Ainu of Japan complain of ‘bear headaches’ that resemble the heavy 
steps of a bear; ‘musk deer headaches’, like the lighter galloping of running deer; 
and ‘woodpecker headaches’, as if pounding into the bark of a tree. Crucially, chills 
are not present during these kinds of headaches. Headaches that presented 
themselves with a chill required aquatic animal metaphors: such as an ‘octopus 
headache’ with its sucking motion or a ‘crab headache’ with its distinctive, prickling 
sensation (Ohnuki-Tierney 1981, 49-50). In China, pain narratives are strongly 
affected by the traditional Chinese medical ideas about imbalance. Thus, metaphors 
for headaches revolve around notions of vertigo or painful dizziness (Ots 1990, 34). 
Chinese metaphors are also much more likely than English ones to refer to body 
parts, also explicable in terms of the theories of Yin-yang and the five elements of 
Chinese medicine (Yu 2009). Cambodian ‘distinguishes a type of internal tugging, 
throbbing or cramping pain…. Sinhala distinguishes pain thought to be associated 
with an “ill wind” (“emma”), which can affect the head, back, etc.; a different type 
(“rudava”) affects the eyes, ears, teeth and throat’ (Diller 1980, 22). In India, pain’s 
hotness is imaged not only as fire and live coals, but also as ‘parched chickpeas’ and 
its heaviness is compared with ‘a load of grain’. Like many other countries, in India, 
everyday languages of pain do not distinguish between bodily discomfort and 
emotional suffering (Pugh 2005, 117-18). As Fabrega and Tyma observed after 
analyzing pain-languages in English, Thai, and Japanese, ‘to the extent that culture 
and language may actually affect perception, thought and cognition, then to that 
extent they may also affect the actual experience of pain’ (1976, 332). 
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F. Culture and the Creation of Physiology 
 
Later in the article, I will be addressing the issue of non-universal metaphors 
for pain in greater detail, developing the argument that it is insufficient to focus on 
only two of the elements (that is, language and the individual’s body) in my three-
stranded model. Metaphor-creation arises out of the body, but it is also a social 
phenomenon: we need to interrogate further the third of my strands – that of 
culture. 
 
 But before I expand upon that argument, it is important to note that there is 
another way to respond to the question of why a universal human physiology does 
not lead to universal metaphors: that is, to question what we mean by physiology. 
This is not the same as arguing that different cultures or people in different periods 
of history have evaluated physiology in distinctive ways. Ning Yu, for instance, 
admits that culture has ‘an interpretative function in viewing the body and its role in 
grounding metaphor’. Identical parts of the body or physiological processes could 
have differing significance for distinctive groups of people. Consequently, she states, 
it is not surprising that ‘in different cultures and languages, different body parts or 
bodily experiences are selected to map onto and structure the same abstract 
concepts’ (2008, 393).  
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Of course I agree with Yu (and will say more about these selective processes 
later), but her argument does not go far enough. In her model, what is important is 
the way different cultures interpret or value bodily parts and processes. These 
evaluative differences certainly exist and have a major role to play in explaining 
different metaphorical mappings. But, for Yu, human physiology itself remains a 
given. This is where we disagree. I will be arguing that physiology is profoundly 
affected by culture and metaphor.  
 
First, no physiologist will disagree with the statement that individuals possess 
subtly different physiologies. Many physiological facts are about probabilities. 
Muscles that are not used, atrophy; neurological faculties that are ‘exercised’ 
develop in different ways to those that are ignored. Individual physiologies are each 
unique, having been affected by distinctive DNA and molecular structures, feedback 
systems, conditioned reflexes, and so on. In Anglo-American societies, the so-called 
universal human body has generally been predicated upon the male exemplar and a 
particular positioning of bone, tissue, muscle, fluids, and fat. However, human 
physiology is much more diverse in shape and function (fe/male; dis/abled; 
petite/obese) than posited by this model. Not every body is physiologically capable 
of menstruation, nocturnal emissions, labour pains, lactation, or beard-growing, to 
take just a few examples. Different bodies have different physiologies and they 




 Second, it is worth asking: what is meant by ‘physiology’. No one is doubting 
that the human body is a material object, made up of fluids, fat, tissue, muscle, and 
bone, all encased in skin and embellished in practical ways with hair and nails. No 
matter who you are, your blood ‘circulates’; your nerves ‘fire’; your neurons ‘light 
up’. But these ways of understanding the ‘facts’ of physiology are based on 
metaphor. It is not enough to say: abolish the metaphor, and blood will still circulate, 
nerves will still respond sympathetically, and neurons will continue to transmit 
signals. The point is that the very way people and cultures metaphorically fashion 
physiology has profound effects on what that physiology is. The personal body, 
Donna Haraway correctly argues, is not ‘natural, in the sense of existing outside the 
self-creating process called human labour’ (1991, 10). The physiological body is not a 
culture-free object. At every point, the facts of physiology are given cultural 
meanings and these meanings are not something that exist in a pre-social universe, 
but are an integral part of the very organization of that physiology. In other words, it 
is not simply the case that culture ‘inscribes’ something on a ‘natural’, pre-social 
physiology, but that physiological processes cannot be separated from the various 
and varying cultural meanings given to fluids, fat, tissue, muscle, bone, hair, and skin. 
Put bluntly, the humoral physiology of the eighteenth century is not the same as the 
one mapped by Victorian anatomists or, indeed, by twenty-first century 
neuroscientists. This is not a denial that brain activity (for instance) in all humans 
involves complex interactions between receptors, ion channels, nucleic acids, and 
enzymes. But those interactions only make sense in social and environmental 
contexts. The question becomes: if a society does not have a concept of the 
circulation of the blood (as in the seventeenth century), does blood circulate? Yes, 
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but not as we know or – importantly – experience it. Obviously, blood is doing 
something: it is moving according to the heavenly planets, for instance: but that is an 
entirely different thing. Crucially, the choice of figurative language tells its own, 
covert tale about underlining physiological beliefs. Physiological models of the body 
draw attention to certain things and not others, fundamentally affecting what is 
noticed – that is, and given meaning – and what is regarded as incidental. The 
physiological body is constituted by the figurative languages that bring the body into 
the world. Figurative languages ‘disclose’ our being-in-the-world. 
 
G. Humoral Physiology 
 
This point can be illustrated by returning to the conceptual metaphors 
discussed by the cognitive linguists earlier in this article. It turns out that the 
physiological body upon which their schemata are drawn rests upon a historically 
specific, Western conception of physiology.  
 
But what if people in the past conceptualized physiological ‘facts’ in 
completely different ways? The most obvious set of metaphors that people in past 
centuries drew upon to constitute the physiological body emerged from humoral 
theory, which was dominant for much of the period before the nineteenth century. 
The humoral body consisted of four fluids – phlegm, black bile, yellow bile, and 
blood. Linked to these humors were personality types (sanguine and melancholic). 
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There were also three kinds of spirits, which acted on the humors: the natural, the 
vital, and the animal. In this model – unlike the biomedical one that was dominant 
until the 1960s – distinctions between bodies, minds, and souls were not clear-cut. 
Pain was the result of disequilibrium or imbalance. Illness was the result of disrupted 
relationships as much as disrupted physiologies. In the words of historian Ulinka 
Rublack, writing about a sixteenth century ambassador (Bushecq ) who fell ill,  
 
The body itself was not regarded as a whole and clearly delimited 
entity, but rather… was understood as something that was constantly 
changing, absorbing and excreting, flowing, sweating, being bled, 
cupped and purged. It was clearly situated in the continually-changing 
context of a relationship to the world whose precise effect was never 
stable or predictable, so that one simply had to submit to it – to the 
terror that froze the blood, the sudden trembling, bleeding, or 
urination that literally stopped the ambassador Bushecq in his tracks 
(2002, 2). 
 
As a result, humoral theory provided rich figurative languages of ebbs and flows. To 
illustrate the vast differences between the ‘natural’ physiological processes 
described by the cognitive linguists in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries and that of the eighteenth century and earlier, take John Hervey’s 1731 
description of his sister’s suffering. She was 
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choked with phlegm, tormented with a constant cough, perpetual 
sickness at her stomach, most acute pains in her limbs, hysterical fits, 
knotted swellings about her neck and in her joints, and all sorts of 
disorders, consequent to a vitiated viscid [sic] blood, which, too 
glutinous and weak to perform its proper circulation, stops at every 
narrow passage in its progress, causes exquisite pains in all the little, 
irritated, distended vessels of the body, produces tumours in those 
that stretch most easily, and keeps the stomach and bowels 
constantly clogged, griped, and labouring, by the perspirable matter 
reverting there for want of force to make its due secretions and 
evacuate itself through its natural channels in the habit and the pores 
of the skin ([1731] 1931, 971). 
 
Pain in this account is a blockage of natural flows. It pervades all parts of the body, 
and not just particular organs.  
 
This physiology is difficult to reconcile with that assumed by current cognitive 
linguists. Of course, the most basic schema survive: ones based on sensorimotor 
bodily experience of lying down and standing up (HAPPY IS UP and SAD IS DOWN), for 
instance, or those based on physical comportment relating to vigour versus infirmity 
(HEALTH/LIFE ARE UP and ILLNESS/DEATH ARE DOWN). But others take on such a different 
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meaning in the humoral scheme of physiology to be radically different. Take the very 
prominent image schema BALANCE, as in the metaphor ‘pain weighed down her 
spirits’. Earlier, I quoted Johnson as saying that balancing ‘is an activity we learn with 
our bodies and not by grasping a set of rules or concepts’ (1987, 74). According to 
Strathem, it is related to ‘equilibrium in the body, whereby we try to maintain an 
even state’ (1996, 183). The problem is that the notion of ‘equilibrium in the body’ is 
a central tenet of humoral thinking, and one that meant something very different in 
the eighteenth century in comparison to its meaning for Johnson and Strathem in 
the late twentieth century. For eighteenth-century commentators, BALANCE in the 
physiological body referred as much to the flow of animal spirits (within and 
between persons), the alignment of the planets, interpersonal relations, diet, and 
the weather as it did to equilibrium linked to poise and steadiness of a body in the 
environment. 
 
 A similar point can be made about the two conceptual metaphors INTENSITY IS 
HEAT and ANGER IS A HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER. These metaphors, we are told, arise 
from the physiological fact that ‘vigorous bodily activity produces an increase in 
bodily heat’; it is the way our body automatically responds, thus producing the 
conceptual metaphor: INTENSITY IS HEAT (Kövecses 2005, 18). But what if that person 
chopping firewood or vigorously making love understands the process of getting hot 
under the collar (or sheets) not so much in terms of thermoregulation controlled by 
neurons in the brain’s hypothalamus but in terms of the excretion of excess humors? 
This different physiological understanding leads as much to EQUILIBRIUM IS HEAT or 
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EXCRETING SURPLUSES IS HEAT, as to INTENSITY IS HEAT. Indeed, it might even lead to the 
conceptual metaphor MODERATION IS HEAT, in the sense that returning the body to its 
correct, temperate level creates heat. Of course, this is not to deny that in both 
centuries people will get hot under the collar or sheets when working or making 
love, but to claim that this informs a universal physiology which is then mapped onto 
universal conceptual metaphors does not tell us much about the experience of 
different bodies. 
 
Let me just give a few examples of conceptual metaphors employed in the 
humoral body that would make little sense in the biomedical body. The chief one is 
PAIN IS MOVEMENT. As scholar Thomas Gray described his pains in 1755, they 
‘wandering’ throughout his ‘constitution’, until they ‘fix[ed] into the Gout’ (1755, 
np). Pain ‘rolls along sluggishly or like a Wool pack’, in the words of pauper Mary 
Brooks at Guy’s Hospital in November 1810 (‘Guy’s Hospital Case Notes’ 1810, np). 
Pain in these accounts was a blockage of natural flows. It pervaded all parts of the 
body, and not just particular organs.  
 
In this physiological mapping, pain circulates: chased out of one part, it 
migrated to another. As Edward Young described it in 1762,  
 
I have been troubled near thirty years, with Rheumatic Pains; they 
have been now long entirely ceased; and my Physitians [sic] tell me, 
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that [now] Nature throws all that Mischief on my Eyes, & Head (1762, 
np).  
 
Horace Walpole, writing in 1765, was ‘seized with the gout in one foot at the End of 
June, soon had it in both, with great torment, & then without its going out of my 
feet, in head, Stomach, both wrists & both Shoulders’ (np). This was also the 
language used by ‘E. C.’, a patient in the London Dispensary, who described in 1811 
‘a pain in the Stomach, which flew to her head; the pain seemed at first… more like a 
stagnation’ (Rees 1811, 63). 
 
Given such ways of understanding the body, it made little sense to 
distinguish physical from mental pain. An individual’s temperament, what she ate or 
drank, the climate, and relationships with other people all affected her pain. Thus, 
we get the conceptual metaphor PAIN IS A STAGNATING ENVIRONMENT, as in Josiah Atkins’ 
description of pain as a ‘slow stagnated fever… extreme pain in his side, breast, and 
bowels &c.’ ([1781] 1975, 55). PAIN IS CHANGING TEMPERATURE (from the humoral 
physiology) and (in the solidistic tradition of eighteenth century Scottish physicians 
like William Cullen) PAIN IS INELASTICITY are two other important schemata in this 
conception of the body. The Hot/Cold and Wet/Dry basis of humoral medicine 
created major anxieties about change in temperature. Indeed, it was the most 
prominent language for pain in eighteenth century narratives. In the words of a 
Bristol carpenter, he was ‘at a house at work in Clifton, it was very hot, and I drank 
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some cold water, then I was laid up for a week with a bad Stummick’ (Bennett nd, 8). 
Inelasticity appears almost as frequently, as in George Cheyne’s description of pain 
as the result of having ‘filled the original lax Membranes and Vessels [too] full, and 
they being somewhat broken are not sufficiently strong and elastic to force out the 
perspireable Wind and Steams which being retained perpetrate on the Membranes’ 
([1733-43] 1943, 61-2). 
 
My point is not that we should jettison the idea that the physiological body 
has a significant influence on the way people think. Rather, that the body which is 
conceived of in terms of autonomic arousal, cardio-vascular responses, and 
sensorimotor actions is dependent on a very modern conception of the physiological 
body. Like the cognitive linguists, I agree that an analysis of conceptual metaphors 
illustrates some of the ways in which people think via physiological experiences: that 
is, our minds are embodied and the body is ‘mind-ful’. My point is that twentieth 
and twenty-first century theorists project a very modern conception of what 
constitutes that physiology, as though it is the ‘natural’ one. The physiological body 
might be so subtly dissimilar in the past to the modern one, to render processes of 
‘embodiment’ and ‘thinking via physiological experiences’ profoundly different. 
Gibbs rightly quipped that ‘cognition is what happens when the body meets the 
world’: we just should not assume that what ‘happens’ is happening to the same 
body, and that cognitive responses are therefore identical (1999, 153). 
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As I have argued in the last two sections, figurative languages are important 
in constituting the physiological body. I used the example of the figurative languages 
of humoral physiology to argue that eighteenth century bodies-in-pain felt different 
to modern ones. The figurative languages of humoral bodies reveal different ways of 
being-in-the-world. 
 
It is important to observe, though, that causality could also go the other 
direction: physiological ‘facts’ (as understood in the context of the times) could also 
turn into metaphorical commonplaces. Indeed, this is precisely what happened with 
the physiology of the sympathetic nervous system, which was invented in the mid-
eighteenth century as a physiological principle (a ‘sentient principle’) (for example, 
see Jackson 1781, 13; Ord 1836, 26-7; Whytt 1768, 583) and only later in the early 
nineteenth century was turned metaphorically into a social system (sympathizing 
with others) (see Bourke 2012, 430-68). 
 
H. Embodiment and Social Context 
 
 Up to this point in this article, I will have explored interactions between the 
body and metaphor. I have addressed the problem that such individual-based 
processes (particularly those processes dependent upon physiological activity) 
wrongly imply that the body and, therefore, metaphors are universal. Although I 
focused primarily on dialogues between the body and metaphor, when I turned to 
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critique assumptions about the universality of human physiology, I was required to 
pay attention to the effect of social and environmental interactions on not only 
representing the body, but also in creating it. The following section develops this 
argument, emphasizing the effect of interpersonal and environmental interactions.  
In other words, so far, I have been principally concerned with two strands in my 
model: metaphor and body. Now, however, I turn to the third strand: cultural 
interaction. The body that creates language and metaphor is a social entity. The 
entwining of body and language only occurs within social contexts. In the words of 
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘mental language is rendered significant not by 
virtue of its capacity to reveal, mark, or describe mental states, but by its function in 
social interaction’ (1953, 188). Sensations of pain arise in the context of complex 
interactions within the environment, including interactions with other people.  
 
 Bodily sensations and its metaphors do not emerge fully formed out of an 
individual’s head but are forged in interaction with other social worlds from infancy 
onwards: metaphor-creation is a social phenomenon. This is one of the contributions 
anthropologist Thomas Csordas has made to the debates. He began with the familiar 
statement that the image schema for CONTAINMENT is ‘based on one’s own bodily 
experience of things going in and out of the body, and of our body going in and out 
of containers’. However, he rightly observes, containment is much more than simply 
a ‘sensori-motor act’: it was sometimes 
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an event full of anticipation, sometimes surprise, sometimes fear, 
sometimes joy, each of which are shaped by the presence of other 
objects and people that we interact with. Image schemas are not 
therefore simply given by the body but reconstructed out of culturally 
governed interactions (cited by Gibbs 1999, 154). 
 
In other words, people choose their metaphors not as ‘contained’, isolated, 
individual bodies, but in interaction with other bodies and social environments. In 
the context of pain, it makes a difference whether pain was conceived of as being 
inflicted by an infuriated deity, due to imbalance in the ebb and flow of humours, 
emerged after a lifetime of ‘bad habits’, or resulted from an invasion by a germ.  
 
 Pain metaphors can also arise out of interactions within the environment, 
including interactions with other people. As I have argued elsewhere, there is no 
necessary and proportionate connection between the intensity of tissue damage and 
the amount of suffering experienced since phenomenon as different as battle 
enthusiasm, work satisfaction, spousal relationships, and the colour of the analgesic-
pill can determine the degree of pain felt (Bourke 2013). The profound ways that the 
body-in-pain is influenced by the environment and social interactions is at the heart 
of debates about phenomena as diverse as mesmerism, placebos, psychosomatic 
disorders, and so on. 
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Most frequently, pain-metaphors were drawn from everyday encounters – 
interactions with squalling infants, sticking plasters, over-the-counter medicines, 
pincushions, and household objects. For example, in the 1830s and 1840s, a man 
suffering toothache described himself as ‘swaying my body to and fro, as if 
endeavouring to calm a fractious infant’ (in both Anon. ‘The Intrepid’ 1837, 21 and 
‘Toothache’ 1842, 16). It was as if a ‘very strong sticking-plaster were dragging the 
flesh down the bone’, complained 43-year-old Hannah D. at the Royal Free Hospital 
in the 1890s (Head 1894, 375). Around the same time, another patient – this time at 
The London Hospital – was heard describing her pain thus: 
 
Oh sister, I’ve got such a dreadful effervescing headache, and I took a 
Seidlitz powder, and it fizzed up and made it worse, and now the 
powder’s settled behind my eyes and it’s something awful (Anon. 
‘Heard in the Receiving Room’ 1899, 193). 
 
 Clearly, metaphors drawn from everyday encounters with material objects 
(such as Seidlitz powder) were highly volatile: they emerged from the changing 
worlds of business and advertising. There were other, even starker, ways in which 
changes in environment resulted in dramatic shifts in the concrete images available 
to move a subject (in this case, pain) from inchoateness to concreteness. It is no 
coincidence, for instance, that the fascination associated with railways in the mid-
nineteenth century entered the metaphoric languages of pain almost immediately: 
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after all, railways lent themselves particularly well to the imagery of circulatory 
systems, nerves, and veins, with railway tracks as steel arteries; railway engines, 
throbbing inflammations. Pain could easily be depicted as a railway accident. In 
1860s Britain, in particular, railway accidents inspired a series of panics, resulting not 
only in widely reported mass-deaths but also in the invention of entirely new 
diagnostic categories, such as ‘railway spine’ (the predecessor for psychological 
trauma as understood in contemporary parlance). Pain-narratives rapidly transferred 
the concrete image of a railway accident into a completely different context – that of 
nerve-pain, for instance.  In the words of physician Valentine Mott, writing in 1862, 
about the pain of neuralgia:  
 
I have seen the most heroic and stout-hearted men shed tears like a 
child, when enduring the agony of neuralgia. As in a powerful engine 
when the director turns some little key, and the monster is at once 
aroused, and plunges along the pathway, screaming and breathing 
forth flames in the majesty of his power, so the hero of a hundred 
battles, if perchance a filament of nerve is compressed, is seized with 
spasms, and struggles to escape the unendurable agony (5). 
 
Mott drew on the masculine imagery of industry and war. For him, pain was a 
mechanical monster, reducing war-heroes to children. It was a scream, like a train 
horn. It was the searing heat of stoked engines. As in railway accidents, it bore down 
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upon a person by random (fixing on any particular individual by chance), and the 
cause of the disaster might be simple and small – nothing more than the 
compression of a ‘filament of nerve’ – but it was all-powerful and inescapable.  
 
 Railway engines and accidents were one of many tropes of the industrial age 
that were translated into the context of physical pain. Typically, the distressed body 
was spoken about as if it were a flawed machine, with the physician as a kind of 
mechanic whose job it was to ‘fix’ the mechanism. As one patient put it in the 1960s, 
pain was caused by ‘rust around the nerves’, ‘defective ball bearings’, or ‘twisted 
ligaments’ (Zborowski 1969, 85). Not surprisingly, mechanical metaphors – with their 
association with masculine occupations – were more likely to be the way men 
(rather than women) communicated painful sensations. Men even drew on personal 
experiences of mechanical engineering. In the words of one such man describing 
nerve-pain in the 1960s, 
 
That’s – that’s my nerve – that’s very vital. Nerves is a vital thing. I’m 
not a dummy – I can understand, you know, very well. I know how to 
fix an automobile, and if you know how to fix it right you got to be 
smart, you can’t be a dummy. I know that nerves are vital. You can cut 
a nerve – that’s the end of the nerve. You cut your leg off and you get 
a wooden one. But you can’t get a nerve (Zborowski 1969, 87). 
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Like a broken-down car, spare parts could be found for certain parts of the body – 
limbs, for instance: other parts, such as nerves, were irreplaceable.  
 
Electricity was another technology that rapidly entered into languages of 
pain. It was widely employed in pain-metaphors from early in the nineteenth 
century. It may have been a particularly apt metaphor to convey the sensation of 
pain – and not only because of its properties as attacking unexpectedly and with 
dramatic power (related, of course, to lightning). In addition, though, the 
metaphorical link between pain and electricity may also have been related to the 
fact that it had begun to pay an important role as a therapeutic agent against pain. 
From the 1850s, for example, the mass-produced Pulvermacher promised to 
‘speedily sooth[e] agonizing pains’ with an electrical current (for example, see 
‘Electricity is Life’ 1870, 642; ‘On the Therapeutic Employment of Electricity’ 1856, 
108). It is not surprising, then, that electrical metaphors became increasingly 
common in pain discourses. In 1878, for instance, a main described his pain ‘like 
electric shocks in both legs’ (Buzzard 1878, 181). ‘The Young Lord’s Adventure’ 
(1886) included a passage where every time the hero touched ‘one of the tiny men’, 
a ‘sharp, tingling pain, like a powerful shock of electricity’, shot through his body 
(Leys 1886, 244). In 1893, neuralgia was described as a form of ‘excruciating agony’ 
that might ‘appear with the suddenness of an electric shock’ (Anon. ‘Neuralgia’ 
1893, ix). In the 1930s, a 50-year-old woman described ‘burning pains in the left 
upper limb’ like ‘radiating shocks of electricity’ (Leriche 1939, 120). As one patient 
suffering trigeminal neuralgia put it in the 1960s, ‘My pain was caused by a short of 
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two nerves – it’s like electricity. If you put two nerves together and they touch each 
other, it forms a short and that’s why I got my pain’ (Zborowski 1969, 85). In this 
way, metaphors reflected tangible changes in the material environment, which could 
be adopted to help describe less choate sensations. 
 
 War metaphors were also prominent. Pain ‘cracked like the firing of a pistol’ 
(Townend 1869, 18). A ‘mighty pain as if a lyddite shell had hit’ overwhelmed a 
wrestler, according to one account of 1900, just four years after the introduction of 
that explosive into the British army (Anon. ‘Pimple’ 1900, 7). Trigeminal neuralgic 
was described as coming ‘in a succession of short, sharp momentary bursts like 
electric shocks or machine-gun fire’ (Miller 1968, 577). Furthermore, although war-
metaphors had been used since the Middle Ages to describe pain (Montgomery 
1991, 341-91), they became increasingly prominent in pain-talk during times of 
conflict. 
 
The increase in militaristic metaphors in pain-talk was only partly a result of 
the militarization of society in the context of the two World Wars and then the 
threats contained in nuclear technologies. It may also have been a response to the 
introduction of more effective analgesics, such as aspirin. After all, these medical 
technologies were aggressively marketed in militaristic terms. For instance, the first 
use in The Times of the term ‘kill’ in medical advertisements for pain relief occurred 
in 1941 with the headline ‘Genaspirin Kills Pain Quickly – Time It!’, in which a female 
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office-worker claimed that she couldn’t ‘waste time having headaches now that 
we’re short-staffed’ so she took two Genaspirin tablets: her pain was quickly ‘killed’. 
It was during the Second World War that cancer was also described for the first time 
in these advertisements in militarist terms. ‘Defeat the Silent Enemy’, declared the 
advertisement in 1940: donations were required for the Royal Cancer Hospital in 
order to ‘swiften [sic] the attack on Cancer wherever it raises its hideous head…. 
Cancer attacks without declaring War’ (7). Pain was no longer conceived of as an 
entity that had to be passively endured. Rather, it was an ‘enemy’ to be fought and 
ultimately defeated. When the pharmaceutical possibility of eradicating acute and 
chronic pain was limited, endurance could be valorized as a virtue: the introduction 
of effective relief (at least for acute pain) made passive endurance perverse rather 
than praiseworthy. In the latter case, it was the duty of both patient and physician to 
tackle the problem of pain, all guns blazing. 
 
 While industrial, mechanical, and militaristic metaphors were multiplying, 
others underwent a slow decline. Sometimes this can be explained in educational 
terms: with the decline of a classical education, including Latin and Greek, 
metaphors drawn from the classics evaporated. It would be rare, for instance, to 
hear anyone today refer to bodily agony in terms of the bronze bull, made for 
Phalaris (the tyrant of Acragas in Sicily), in which he would roast his enemies alive. 
But this was the way Jonathan Swift (author of Gulliver’s Travels) described his gout 
in 1740. ‘I am and have been these two days in so miserable a way, and so cruelly 
tortured, that can hardly be conceived’, he grumbled to his cousin Martha 
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Whiteway, adding that the ‘whole last night I was equally struck as if I had been in 
Phalaris’s brazen bull and roared as loud for eight or nine hours’ (np). 
 
Similarly, although it was common throughout the period to refer to pain as 
torture (as in an 1862 description of ‘those horrible rhumatic [sic] tortures’) (Moodie 
[1862] 1985, np. Also see Anon. ‘The Treatment of Inoperable Cancer’ nd, np; 
Waggett 1936, 1036), in periods when torture was a judicial reality, torture-
metaphors were not only more common but were also more elaborate. So, in 1756 
when Thomas Gray described John Chute as having experienced ‘the Gout for these 
five days with such a degree of pain & uneasiness, as he never felt before’, he also 
reported that, for forty hours, ‘it seem’d past all human suffering, & he lay 
screaming like a Man upon the rack. [sic] the torture was so great’ (np). ‘Nature’ and 
rural metaphors for pain also declined. Pain that resembled ‘dogs… biting him’ 
(Sidless 1778, np) could be heard throughout the period, but less frequently in 
increasingly urbanized environments where dogs were more likely to be pampered 
pets than work-dogs or strays. Similarly, pain that ‘flickered’ like candles or oil lamps 
was more common when these were the dominant form of lighting. This is one 
reason why a comment by George Rees in 1811 is intriguing. Rees was referring to a 
35-year-old patient called Mrs. W. who ‘complains of great weakness and internal 
sinking… violent Spasms at times, which almost stop her respiration, and shoot from 
the pit of the Stomach’. He noted that her symptoms included ‘a flickering at the 
stomach’. After the word ‘flickering’, however, Rees inserted a footnote: the word 
‘flickering’, he commented, was ‘frequently made use of by the common people’. It 
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was ‘a kind of onomatopoeia which is easily understood, [so] I have used it, that the 
case may be conveyed as far as possible in the language of the patient’ (1811, 191). 
It was a pain-metaphor that would decline with the advent of electric light bulbs that 
‘shocked’, ‘sparked’, and ‘blew’ rather than flickered or spluttered.  
 
 However, the two largest groups of metaphors that underwent catastrophic 
decline were those of humours and religion. I have already mentioned the first of 
these shifts in the context of the very different understanding of the body according 
to humoral medicine. The fading away of humoral physiology was responsible for the 
increase in more individualized images of bodily-pain: the body was more contained, 
more isolated. With germ theory, pain metaphors became something much more 
mechanistic and invasive. 
 
The decline in religious metaphors is also important, however. In the earlier 
period, pain was much more likely to be characterized as a demon or fiend; it 
propelled sufferers into hell-fire. In 1816, a hypochondriac felt like he had ‘seven 
devils in my belly’, which could be cured by electric shocks from ‘a kind of machine’ 
(Anon. ‘Extraordinary Cure’ 1816, 144). In 1818,  
 
That devil, call’d the Tooth-ache, comes,  
Without an invitation; 
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And got tight hold of my stumps and gums, 
And swore he’d keep his station (Hudson 1818, 20).  
 
In ‘The Toothache’ (1833), the tooth ‘continued to ache, ache, ache, as if some fiend 
were beating and beating upon the nerve with his invisible and tormenting 
hammer… the fiend still beating and beating and beating with unrelenting 
perseverance’ (Anon. 37). For a farm labourer in 1878, phantom limb pain (the result 
of his fingers being torn off by a ‘machine at Farmer Robinson’s’) not only drove him 
‘mad with an empty belly’ but also caused him ‘pain like hell-fire where your fingers 
ought to be’ (Anon. ‘Almost a Quixote’ 1878, 71). In 1881, The Sporting Times even 
characterized the pain of neuralgia as a ‘demon’ that a sufferer could ‘drive away’ by 
a ‘nourishing, plentiful, and wholesome diet’ (which he described as including ‘plenty 
of good soups, oysters, rump steaks, &c. washed down with good stout or port wine, 
not spirits’) (Tupman 1881, 902). 
 
 The decline of religious metaphors also resulted in a reduction in the number 
of positive images of pain – bodily agony being an angel, for instance. According to 
these metaphors of pain, pain was God’s sentinel. In the words of the author of 
Cheering Views of Man and Providence, ‘Who can calculate the self-destruction that 
would ensure, were it not for this vigilant sentinel, this stern commandment 
stationed in the frail body by Providence?’ (Burton 1832, 28-9). As another author 
concluded in 1854, pain was a ‘prayer uttered by the nerve for healthy blood’: it was 
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‘placed by our Maker as the beneficent guardian of this mortal fabric, a warning 
friend more often than an avenging angel’ (Sieveking, 157). As the short story 
entitled ‘The Angel’ contended a few years later, pain was an angel ‘warning you of 
danger’. It was an angelic reminder that ‘imprudence’ (in this case, dressing ‘too 
thinly’ at night) would ‘bring its own punishment’ (Arthur 1858, 183. Also see 
Scholastica 1915, 150 and ‘W.G.W.’ 1918, 84). The negative metaphors for pain (as 
hell-fire or demonic) declined before those of pain as an angelic visitation, although 
both can still be found but only in literature that is explicitly theological (Agnew and 




 The relationship between body, language, and cultural interactions is a 
dynamic, inter-reactive one. Concepts within embodied cognition are useful to the 
historian because they provide a way of mapping the interactive nature of body and 
language as it changes through time, allowing us to speculate on historical shifts in 
sensation. Metaphors arise from the nature of our bodies, which, in turn, are in 
dialogue with metaphor. Bodies are not pure ‘soma’ but are constituted by social 
interactions and linguistic processes. Sensory perceptions are crucial in generating 
knowledge. Social environments and physiology map themselves strongly in the 
figurative languages people employ to communicate their pain. Cultural forces 
impose their own logic upon bodies and pain-narratives  
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This way of thinking about pain and the way it has been communicated in the 
past usefully muddies mind/body dualism. Its dynamic structure allows for the 
possibility of investigating different bodies (male, female, pink, brown, black, petite, 
obese, and so on), and, crucially for my project, it opens a space for exploring the 
ways in which painful sensations change-over-time. People’s experiences of their 
bodies are shaped by environmental contexts and cultural processes, including 
language and dialect, power relations, gender, class and cultural expectations, and 
the weight and meaning given to religious, scientific, and other knowledges. Bodies 
are not simply entities awaiting social inscription (as implied in the ‘body as text’ 
metaphor) but are active agents in both creating social worlds and, in turn, being 
created by them. Human experience, in the words of Kirmayer, ‘emerges from our 
bodily being-in-the-world’. As Kirmayer points out, people’s experiences 
 
reflect both the physiological machinery of the body and its cultural 
shaping through ongoing interaction with others across the lifespan. 
Physiology underwrites the stories that constitute the self, even as 
our self-depiction remodels bodily structures and reconfigures their 
functions (2007, 363).  
 
People are born into worlds that are not of their own making: they must navigate 
within this world, and they do so by employing not only the existing metaphorical 
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tools but also the ability to imaginatively create other conceptual domains from 
bodily experiences.  These metaphors don’t merely reflect pain but are crucial in 
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